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This question posed to me a couple of months ago, after I had just completed my presentation at an academic forum, surprised me for two reasons: The question came from a CIA analyst, and it had been a US official, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke who had attempted to bully President Izetbegovic into stopping the advance of the BiH Army.
Misconceptions have not had a history of rising innocently when it comes to Bosnia & Herzegovina. For that reason, it was good to read recently the two highest US officials in Sarajevo correct a misconception and emphasize that Bosnia & Herzegovina does not depend on the Dayton Accords for its sovereignty or territorial integrity while Republika Srpska is beholden to the Accords for its standing as an entity within the sovereign state of BiH. Just a few days ago, Mr. Daniel Fried also amplified the same point: BiH and the RS have two totally different sources of legitimacy as well as legal international standing. These US officials had been finally reacting to claims made by some ultranationalist Serb leaders that the RS could opt for a referendum on splitting from BiH. Correcting the misconception was welcome, but there was still no clear vision or will to make a clean break with a stale, if not flawed strategy.
The misconception that somehow BiH and the RS rose out of the Dayton Accords had been furthered, up to only a year ago innocently or otherwise, by the official State Department website which stated that Bosnia & Herzegovina had been established in Dayton in 1995. After my letter to Secretary of State Rice, (a copy is affixed here), and the protests of KBSA, this misconception on the State Department website was changed. Maybe the misconception was an innocent mistake. Perhaps it was an act of overreaching into BiH’s history and legitimacy in order to claim future prerogatives. It certainly did marginalize the sacrifices of the citizen soldiers of BiH in the defense of their country as well as the political and diplomatic accomplishments and standing of Bosnia & Herzegovina. There was clearly a discernable strategy of marginalizing BiH’s status and the moral and standing of its leadership while promoting the legitimacy of the RS. We should recall that only a couple of years ago, Dodik and Kostunica were being promoted by many international officials and bureaucrats.
However, I do not believe that the State Department or US was trying to promote RS separatism. To the contrary, many US officials fear RS separatism.. This is not though because they are concerned what the RS would look like, although they should be bothered. Rather, there is a fear, irrational as it may be, of how the remaining “Muslim dominated Bosnia & Herzegovina†would evolve. Whatever may or may not have been “promised†to Milosevic, Mladic or Karadzic preceding Dayton, US officials have no tolerance for any breakup of BiH. It was now time, in the eyes of some US officials to emphasize the international standing and legitimacy of BiH over any competing claims by some RS politicians.
The situation though was perceived and maneuvered differently until recently.
I can only speculate, but, honestly I cannot with full confidence answer the above question. My conversation with the before mentioned CIA analyst though has encouraged my reevaluation of the facts.
ï® The people of Bosnia & Herzegovina were suffering with killings and deprivation and the war had to be ended: as President Izetbegovic stated after Dayton, even if it was an unjust peace over a just defensive war.
ï® RBiH, though, was not on the verge of defeat. It had defended the state under the most difficult times from 1992 to 1995, and the Army of BiH had proven and expanded its capacity.
ï® Was the Army of BiH on the verge of liberating the country, or at least most of it, (keeping in mind the freeing of Bihac and the intervention of NATO airpower)?
When the CIA analyst asked me, “why did Izetbegovic stop at Banja Luka,†I responded with my own question: “Do you think that the Army of BiH could have taken Banja Luka?†His answer was a clear “yes!â€
This answer was in definitive contrast to Ambassador Holbrooke’s pitch when he unexpectedly came to Sarajevo in the first days of fall in 1995 preceeding the Dayton talks. Holbrooke, then in capacity of chief US negotiator for BiH, had demanded a “one on one meeting†with President Izetbegovic. The President agreed, but insisted that I accompany him. Holbrooke objected to my presence vehemently, but Izetbegovic was adamant that I attend, as much as he felt more secure when I as an American was with him to counter the quick maneuvering Holbrooke.
The three of us moved into a small, unadorned, private room in the Konak. Holbrooke was edgy and rushed into his demand, weary eyes glancing in my direction. “You must agree to a cease fire!â€
President Izetbegovic was silent for a few seconds, and then answered: “OK, in a week we agree.â€
 President Izetbegovic kept his head down as Holbrooke fidgeted agitatedly. Then he looked in my direction as he again repeated. “In 7 days we will have cease fire.†Holbrooke gathered himself for only a moment, and then with more than a tinge of desperation launched into wounding Izetbegovic’s confidence. “You are starting to lose in Krajina. The Croats will stab you in the back, and your generals are lying to you!†It was a poker bluff, but nonetheless, it came from the apparent representative of the country that had by far the best cards and leverage at the table. It was also US and NATO air power that had dramatically altered the course of the war. For the first time President Izetbegovic was a bit taken aback by Holbrooke’s aggressiveness. I rose from my chair and interjected myself physically to give President Izetbegovic a bit of room from the hovering Holbrooke. There was no spoken threat of US or NATO military power against BiH, but Holbrooke was evidently trying to imply such, bluff or not, with his physical demeanor and tone of voice. |
“No, now!†Holbrooke immediately interjected. Holbrooke’s absolute demand was in contrast to the many signals that US officials were sending to us only a week or so earlier.
President Izetbegovic kept his head down as Holbrooke fidgeted agitatedly. Then he looked in my direction as he again repeated. “In 7 days we will have cease fire.â€
Holbrooke gathered himself for only a moment, and then with more than a tinge of desperation launched into wounding Izetbegovic’s confidence. “You are starting to lose in Krajina. The Croats will stab you in the back, and your generals are lying to you!â€
It was a poker bluff, but nonetheless, it came from the apparent representative of the country that had by far the best cards and leverage at the table. It was also US and NATO air power that had dramatically altered the course of the war.
For the first time President Izetbegovic was a bit taken aback by Holbrooke’s aggressiveness. I rose from my chair and interjected myself physically to give President Izetbegovic a bit of room from the hovering Holbrooke. There was no spoken threat of US or NATO military power against BiH, but Holbrooke was evidently trying to imply such, bluff or not, with his physical demeanor and tone of voice.
In a bit of a cracking but now slightly raised voice, President Izetbegovic responded: “I do not believe my Generals are lying to me.â€
Holbrooke suddenly turned from menacing to indulgent. “Believe me, your generals are not telling you the truth. You are losing territory and the Croats will turn on you.â€
Izetbegovic was still composed, but becoming impatient. Holbrooke’s comments and tone were well beyond the bounds of diplomatic protocol. Izetbegovic continued: “I will speak with my generals, and I will send Sacirbey to Zagreb to speak with the Croats. In one week, we speak.†Izetbegovic looked toward me. I gave my non-verbal endorsement
Holbrooke was about to engage in another assault upon Izetbegovic’s resolve, and I decided to help the President conclude the meeting. As Holbrooke continued his various efforts at persuasion, I insisted that I had to leave to get to Zagreb by that afternoon. The President would need to call a meeting of the BiH Presidency to rely the conversation and dispatch me to Zagreb. I repeated President Izetbegovic’s decision: “one week!â€
Holbrooke took the conclusion as a personal affront. On the other hand, I was not convinced that this was not another more Holbrooke than America demand. Holbrooke had made it a point of exhibiting his ability to manipulate, bluff or bully various parties within and outside the region in order to impress upon all that he was personally in charge. Regardless, Holbrooke was a master of and understood one critical part of the rules of this match: who ever takes the lead, their initiative will determine the bounds and rules. The US would follow Holbrooke, rather than Holbrooke following instructions from Washington, if there was an apparent vacuum at the top.
In Part II:
1. If Banja Luka was apparently ready to fall, why would Holbrooke attempt to bluff or threaten in order to save the RS?
2. Only a week or so earlier, Holbrooke had directed that the BiH Army move on Prijedor. Some of his colleagues had even suggested that we advance at Banja Luka. Was Holbrooke now acting on his own initiative to prove his ability to control or was this part of a broader effort to save Republika Srpska from extinction?
3. The results of my mission to Zagreb, and did Croatia, as Holbrooke threatened, “Stab us in the back?â€
4. My journey to Banja Luka.
5. In the context of the Dayton talks, was Republika Srpska envisioned to be a permanent or, in the alternative, more transitional factor on the road to the eventual reintegration of all of BiH?
6. Is there now a new effort on the part of some international diplomatic or political leaders to again rescue Republika Srpska? The leadership of the RS is again engaged in big talk to compensate for its weak legal, moral and practical position. The RS was established by the military and genocidal strategy of Belgrade, but it could not have survived nor now continue without the implicit support of those translating the policy of big powers within BiH and the region.
7. Is the “genocidal fortress†more of a hollow, decorated pis pot, (tuta)?
8. Why would the victims of genocide and BiH loyalists now accept the RS as a permanent fixture, whether to soothe Belgrade’s wounded ultra-nationalism or to allow Banja Luka nationalists to tone down their pointless rhetoric. Politicians in RS can threaten separation, but they have no legal status or practical means to pursue it nor will Euro-Atlantic leaders allow it for their own motives.
9. State Department Under-Secretary Daniel Fried has correctly pointed out that Belgrade lost Kosovo by its actions in 1999. However, in the same interview, he urges that the permanency of the RS be accepted. Then by this collective logic are we to assume that Republika Srpska has gained a legitimized status now due to its behavior from 1992 to 1995 that it did not have in 1992 within the RBiH?
10. The BiH leadership and still suffering victims of genocide are not obliged to accept the RS existence as lasting just to make some international officials look better and in control. (BiH has already been through that game and has lost much more than gained for having trusted and acted in good faith). Perhaps we should understand that the “international†leadership in BiH has become accustomed to Dodik as impossible to deal with therefore again making the Bosnian/Herzegovinian loyalists into the “low hanging fruit†easiest to pick.